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Abstract: This paper analyzes the evolution of competition in the Tunisian banking sector in the 
period 2000 - 2008, which is a period of deregulation, liberalization and consolidation of 
the sector. For this purpose, we use two indicators of the competition from the theory of 
the industrial organization (the Lerner index and the Panzar and Rosse’s H-statistic). The 
empirical evidence does not permit us to reject the existence of monopolistic competition. 
The evolution of Lerner index over the period of study shows a low tendency to concentra-
tion. The movements of the mergers of the banking institutions seem to be slow, as a big 
effort of cleaning their balance sheets remains to be achieved before banks can merge. 
Keywords: Banking Competition, Concentration, Market power, Panzar and Rosse Methodology, 
Lerner index.
JEL Classifi cation: G28
Introduction
The importance of the credit as a means of fi nancing companies in most of the de-
veloping countries has led to wonder about the effects of the fi nancial liberalization 
on the increase of the banking competition. In Tunisia, like in many other countries, 
the liberalization of fi nancial services in general and the activities of banks haven’t 
stopped evolving. The implementation of the Structural Adjustment Plan in Tunisia 
(1987) was expressed, in its fi nancial and monetary component, by reforms aiming 
at the liberalization of the Tunisian banking system. The latter had to adapt itself to 
the imperatives of a fi nancial liberalization assimilating the competition as the main 
explanatory element of the effi ciency in the fi nancial institutions.
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An important factor to take into consideration when we evaluate effi ciency is 
competition. A more competitive market is generally tightly associated with higher 
effi ciency. An increased competition on the market of credit implies a decrease of the 
monopoly rents in banks, and a reduction in the costs of fi nancing companies. The 
productive investment is favored and the growth is stimulated. However, the progres-
sive liberalization of the banking services has led banks to adopt strategies of merger 
and concentration. These strategies would possibly be the most adapted solutions to 
exploit the opportunities of synergy ruined by fragmentation and subdivision of the 
sector. They would also allow the Tunisian economy to be equipped with solid and 
powerful banks capable of facing competition from foreign banks which would prob-
ably establish themselves on the Tunisian territory.
The analysis of banks’ expansion strategies and the development of the range of 
their activities oblige us to take into account the banking market structures. Precisely, 
we can examine the concentration in relation to the market power. This issue is one 
of the most acute problems which is raised by the presence of large-sized banks. 
Linking mergers and acquisitions to the strategies of market power, implies having 
opposite price policies in the interests of the consumers of the banking services. This 
would lead to envisage their unfavorable impact on the fi nancing process of produc-
tive investment, which in itself is the source of economic growth.
The empirical researches dedicated to this question have given contrasted results. 
In fact, a study by Bikker and Haaf (2002) on 23 European countries tends to confi rm 
the classical opinion:”concentration harms competition”. However, in another study 
which is based on a sample including around 4,000 banking institutions in about fi fty 
countries, Claessens and Laeven (2005) conclude that the competition is not negatively 
associated with concentration. In addition, these authors establish in addition a clear 
relationship between the increased competition in the sector of fi nancial services and 
the lack of entry barriers (including the barriers applied to foreign banks), accompanied 
by few governmental restrictions imposed on the activities of fi nancial services.
The study of Claessens and Laeven (2005) advocates the notion of contestability 
[Baumol et.al. (1982)], which deals with the capacity of companies to enter a bank-
ing market and to compete with the already established ones. A market is considered 
contestable if barriers in access are not excessive and if the conditions of exit are not 
too penalizing. Thus, companies are not dissuaded from entering this market from 
the beginning. The basic idea is that the already present company on a market will 
feel obliged to increase its competitiveness and its effi ciency to face potential com-
petitors. So, instead of relying only on the measures of the concentration of the mar-
ket to estimate the degree of competition in a given sector, we are inclined to favor 
the market actors’ behavior to gauge the degree of contestability of a sector.
The notion of the contestability has also contributed to the study of both the com-
petition between banks and to the behavior of banks on the market. Indeed, this 
notion leads to a conclusion contrary to the Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) 
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approach. The latter concludes that an oligopoly characterized by the existence of 
economies of scale cannot behave in a competitive way and generates high profi ts. 
The theory of the contestable markets states that if this oligopoly behaves as a con-
testable market, its price will be close to the marginal cost. Thus the contestability of 
a market leads the industry to an effi cient confi guration. This result is worth, espe-
cially, in the case of a bank with a multi-product production [Dietsch (1991)].
Consequently, it is not necessary for a sector to be in a situation of effective com-
petition so that the price equals the marginal cost: it is enough to be in a situation of 
potential competition. So, the number of fi rms on the market is not necessarily an 
indicator of competition.
Our research will use measures of competition and not concentration to describe 
the competitive dynamics of the Tunisian banking sector. We will use two measures 
of bank market power: a fi rst approach will consist in calculating Lerner index and a 
second approach will deal with the calculation of the H-statistic of Panzar and Rosse 
(hereafter P-R) (1977; 1982 and 1987) appropriate for the Tunisian banking sector. 
The remaining part of our paper is organized as follows: In the section 1, we 
briefl y present the evolution of the Tunisian banking sector during the period 2000 
- 2008. In section 3, we present the methodology: the approaches used to measure the 
degree of competition in the banking industry, namely the approach of Panzar and 
Rosse and that of Lerner. Section 4 includes the empirical analysis and the results. 
Finally, section 5 represents the conclusion.
The Evolution of the Tunisian Banking Sector
In 2007, the Tunisian banking sector consisted of 4 big banks running 51% of the 
sector’s assets and each holding a part of the assets exceeding 10%,  5 average banks 
monopolizing together 34% of the total assets in this sector and 11 small banks shar-
ing the remaining 15% of total assets. 
Indeed, the Tunisian banking sector presents a relatively low concentration when 
compared internationally. The Herfi ndahl-Hirschmann Index (HHI) of the industry 
concentration confi rms the fragmentation of the Tunisian banking sector.
Table 1: The evolution of the Herfi ndahl-Hirschmann index (HHI)
2007 2008 2009 2009*
Total assets 0.1171 0.1157 0.1131 0.2035
Customer loan 0.1200 0.1198 0.1165 0.15780
Customer deposit 0.1164 0.1157 0.1139 0.1780
Net banking income 0.1148 0.1129 0.1122 0.1445
(*) Estimated value, in case of merger between the STB and BH
Source : Maxula BOURSE (2010)
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We notice that the HHI is widely below 1. So the weakness of this index gives 
evidence that the banking sector is fairly fragmented. With such a fragmented bank-
ing sector, the Tunisian economy can not be exempt from the negative impact of 
globalization.
The Tunisian banks are of average sizes with regard to their African and Arabic 
counterparts. Table 2 indicates Algeria as the country having the most concentrated 
banking sector with 95 % of assets held by the fi rst fi ve banks against 75 % in Mo-
rocco, 65 % in Tunisia and 63 % in Egypt.
Table 2: The rate of banking concentration in Northern Africa region
Algeria Morocco Tunisia Egypt
The rate of deposits held by the fi rst 5 banks 94 75,00 64,5 63,10
The rate of assets held by the fi rst 5 banks 95 66,48 64,8 61,80
Source: Barth and al. (2003)
In terms of fi nancial reforms, the Tunisian experience seems to be paradoxical 
since the process of fi nancial liberalization did not incite banks to restructure and 
strengthen themselves. The Fitch Ratings notation agency which considers that the 
rhythm of privatization in the banking sector is slow. This can be accounted for by 
the big efforts that the public banks should make to clean the balance sheets and 
therefore to be able to provide attractive opportunities for private investments “. 
Indeed, the Tunisian banks face several problems today: a high level of bad debts, 
an insuffi cient capitalization, a bad quality of their assets, and an unsatisfactory prof-
itability. Concerning this crucial point of portfolio quality of the Tunisian banks, 
Fitch Ratings indicates that the part of the classifi ed debts, with regard to the total of 
bank commitments, amounts to 21 % for commercial banks and 28 % for develop-
ment banks. However, this presentation of fi gures tends to overvalue the quality of 
the bank assets, by including the off balance sheet items in the denominator of the 
ratio and then it reduces the possibility of being internationally compared. Besides, 
the cover of these bad debts classifi ed at 44 % for the commercial banks and 66 % 
for development banks allows us to conclude that “the Tunisian banking system as a 
whole is insuffi ciently funded”.
Being fragmented, badly structured, and incapable of rising to the internation-
al standards, the Tunisian banking sector can not serve the national economy. The 
Tunisian banks cannot fi nance megaprojects. In a country that is renowned for its 
foreign investment promotion, the Tunisian banks are expected to study the possibili-
ties of increasing their fi nancial potential via well-studied mergers. This is likely to 
strengthen the Tunisian banks and make them capable of fi nancing megaprojects. 
For example, Orascom Telecom Tunisie (Tunisiana) resorted to foreign funds to fi -
nance its implantation in Tunisia. Because of the limited reserves in foreign cur-
rencies, deposits and guarantees are considered insuffi cient in terms of volume and 
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especially the problems of important unpaid loans which characterize the Tunisian 
domestic banks. The fact of creating banking groups through mergers will lead to 
improve their margin of progress and the availability of funds. Moreover, the fi nan-
cial groups which acquired Tunisian banks were able to overcome hardships to assure 
important returns on their investments. We note cases such as The Tuniso-Kuwaiti 
Bank (Caisse d’épargne Group), The International Banking Union (Société Générale 
Group) and Attijari Bank (Attijariwafa Bank Group). These alliances are regarded 
as the major response to the fragmentation of the Tunisian banking sector and these 
mergers remain a solution to several other troubles: the basic problem is to face the 
competition from foreign banks on the Tunisian local banking market. This might 
allow the merged Tunisian banks to expand and eventually be able to open up sub-
sidiaries beyond the Tunisian borders.
The search for a better effi ciency, for a critical size and for a market power are 
so many factors which urged the Tunisian monetary authorities to set up reforms to 
restructure the fi nancial and banking system. The strategy of concentration, gener-
ally by merger - acquisition, is indispensable because, in addition to the fact that it 
strengthens stockholders’ equity and safety of banks, it serves as a protection against 
OPA unfriendly foreigners which weaken the monetary sovereignty and exclude pri-
ority social projects (housing, farming, etc.) from being fi nanced. It also allows us to 
respond better to the increasing needs of fi nancing. These mergers also strengthen the 
oligopolistic competition between major actors and improve the quality of the serv-
ices and encourage innovation. However, the concentration indices are little reliable 
to measure the intensity of competition in the small economies where the number of 
banks is small [Bikker (2004)].
Methodology: The Approaches Used to Measure the Degree of Competition
The studies which analyzed the effects of the concentration on the effi ciency by us-
ing various indices of concentration as that of Herfi ndahl-Hirshman and the market 
share held by the three or fi ve bigger banks [Gondat-Larralde and Lepetit (2001), 
Fries and Taci (2005), Lensink and al. (2008)], do not allow us to describe its com-
petitive dynamics suitably. Indeed, the fact that the market is concentrated does not 
necessarily imply a weak competition. Cetorelli (1999) shows that, generally, the 
relation between concentration and competition is not obvious especially on the con-
testable markets. Consequently, the competition cannot be measured by indicators of 
structure such as the number of institutions, the Herfi ndahl-Hirshman index and the 
other measures of concentration. This aspect was also empirically demonstrated by 
some studies. For example, Pruteanu-Podpiera and al. (2008) on the Czech banking 
system or that of Gutiérrez de Rozas (2007) on the Spanish banking system, did not 
fi nd a negative relation between the measures of concentration and the measures of 
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competition estimated by the Lerner index in the fi rst study and by the H-statistic of 
Panzar-Rosse in the second).
1. The P-R approach
In order to assess the contestability of banking markets in Tunisia, we carry out tests 
derived from the New Industrial Organization literature, in particular Panzar and 
Rosse (1987), based on reduced form revenue functions. Market power is measured 
by the extent to which changes in input prices are refl ected in revenues. 
The equation for the reduced form of revenue i over a period t is shown in the fol-
lowing specifi cation:








Where i denotes banks and t denotes years. TR is the ratio of gross revenues to 
total assets, W is a vector of the price of factors; S is a vector of variables of structure; 
and ε is an error term.
With perfect competition, and when banks operate at their long-run equilibrium, a 
proportional increase in factor prices (including the interest rate on liabilities) induc-
es an equiproportional change in gross revenues, output does not change in volume 
terms, while the output price rises to the same extent as the input price (i.e. demand 
is perfectly elastic). On the other hand, under monopolistic competition, revenues 
will increase less proportionally than the changes in input prices as the demand for 
banking products facing individual banks is inelastic [Tirole (1987)]. In the case of 
monopoly there may be no response or even a negative response of gross revenues to 
changes in input prices.
To assess the degree of competition in banking markets, the empirical strategy 
adopted by P-R (1982; 1987) implies therefore to compute an index defi ned as the 
sum of the elasticities of gross revenues to unit factor cost in a reduced form revenue 
equation (the H-statistic). This index is negative in the case of monopoly, positive but 
smaller than 1 with monopolistic competition or equal to 1 if perfect competition 
prevails.




 is a derived total revenue in relation to knth input price. The 
H-statistic of the P-R model is defi ned by the sum of the elasticities of the reduced 
form revenue, knowing the input prices.









The conclusions of this approach crucially suppose, that banks are in their long-
run equilibrium [Shaffer (1982)]. This hypothesis is strong, particularly if we try to 
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observe the evolutions of the macroeconomic, institutional, and regulatory contexts 
following the implementation of the fi nancial reforms in Tunisia.
2. The Lerner index
The second approach to assess the degree of competition is to examine the differ-
ential between the prices that banks charge for their services and the marginal costs 
they  incur to provide these services. A high margin would suggest a high level of 
market power and hence, a lower degree of competition in the banking sector.
By noting P
it
 the average price proposed by a bank i at the time t for its products, 
and by MC
it








 defi nes the Lerner monopoly power index evaluating the de-
gree with which the market power of a monopoly allows it to set a price higher than 
the marginal cost of production. The index value will characterize the competitive 
situation with the following interpretations:
- In a situation of perfect competition (elasticity of the demand (ε) is very big or 
infi nite), the value of the index would get closer to zero;
- In a situation of real monopoly (elasticity of the demand (ε) is null or close to 
zero), the value of the ratio would move towards the infi nity;
- Finally, between these two extremes, the elasticity of the demand (ε) varies in an 
inverse way of the monopoly power, so we fi nd intermediate competitive situations.
Empirical Analyses
The subject of this section is to test the level of competition in the Tunisian banking 
system. To this end, we establish the function of cost by adopting the approach of 
intermediation where the banking products are the credits and the other remunerative 
assets. Such a function allows us to defi ne the two measuring instruments taken from 
the new theory of the industrial organization: the H-statistic of Panzar and Rosse and 
the Lerner index.
1. Sample and variables selected
To achieve this empirical study, we use the method of data belonging to the statistical 
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pendix 1, for the period which spreads out between 2000 and 2008. The Professional 
Association of Tunisian Banks is our principal source of data through its annual 
reports.
To estimate the indicators of market power, we will need to estimate the functions 
of profi tability, revenue and costs, of the banking fi rm. For that purpose, we defi ne 
the variables indicated in the tables below:
Table 3 : Defi nition of dependent variables
Designation of variables Description Authors
ROA= Profi tability The pre-tax Return on Total assets
Shaffer S. (1982); Molyneux and al. (1994; 
1996); Claessens and Laeven (2004)
TR= Total Revenue 
Interests and Revenues assimilated 
on Total assets 
De Bandt and Davis (2000)
TC = Total Costs Financial and Operational costs
Boutillier M. and al. (2004)
P = Banks’ output price
TR= Interests and Revenues 
assimilated on Total assets
Classes and Laeven (2004)
Table 4: Defi nition of the independent variables
Designation of variables Description Authors
W1 = The price of labor  Ratio of Personnel expenses to 
Total assets
Molyneux and al. (1994) 
Bikker and Groeneveld (2000)
W2 = The proxy of input 
price of deposits 
Ratio of Interest expenses to Total 
deposits 
Boutillier M. and al. (2004)
W3 = The proxy for input 
price of equipment / fi xed 
capital 
Ratio of the Operating and 
Administrative expenses to Total 
assets 
De Bandt and Davis (2000)
TA= The proxy of bank 
output 
Total Assets Berger, Klapper and Turk-Ariss (2008)
S1 = Variable of structure Total net loans to Total Assets Boutillier M. and al. (2004)
S2 = Variable of structure Total banking Deposit to Total 
Assets
Boutillier M. and al. (2004)
2. The empirical specifi cation of P-R Model
Step 1: The checking of the hypothesis of long-term equilibrium
For accurate identifi cation of the H-statistic using an estimated revenue equation 
based on a static equilibrium model, it is necessary to assume that markets are 
in a long-run equilibrium state at each point in time when the data are observed. 
Shaffer (1982) proposed a test of the market equilibrium assumption. Competitive 
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capital markets should equalize risk-adjusted returns across banks in equilibrium. 
Accordingly, the equilibrium profi t rate should be uncorrelated with the input 
prices. This test is commonly implemented through estimation of the following 
regression:
(4)
where i denotes banks and t denotes years, ln = The natural operating logarithm, Wj 
is the vector of the input prices, S is the vector of structure variables, α denotes bank-
level fi xed effects and ε is an error term.
Because ROA can take on negative values, we compute the dependent variable 
as ln(1+ROA). We defi ne the equilibrium E-statistic as β1+β2+β3 from equation (4). 
The test of the long-run equilibrium involves testing whether E-statistic equals zero. 
In other words, the market is in equilibrium if the return on assets is not related to 
input prices.
By estimating a sample of panel data, the fi rst thing which is worth checking is 
the homogeneous or heterogeneous specifi cation of the generative process of data. 
Econometrically speaking, we should test the equality of the coeffi cients of the 
model studied in the individual bases. The tests of specifi cation consist in deter-
mining if we are entitled to suppose that the studied theoretical model is perfectly 
identical for all banks, or on the contrary there are specifi cities appropriate for each 
bank.
The presence of specifi c effects for every individual bank makes the least ordi-
nary squares (OLS) estimators not convergent. In these conditions, we have to refer 
to the estimation by the within method if these effects are fi xed, or the method of the 
generalized least squares (GLS) if these effects are at random.
The application of the test pertaining to the existence of the individual specifi ci-
ties shows that the statistics of Fisher associated with the test of homogeneity are 
superior to the  values  of  Fisher indicated  on the statistical table [2.56 > F (N-1; NT-
N-K-1) = F (17 ;138) = 1.69] or (prob of the test = 0 < 5 %), with N=18, is the banks’ 
number, T = 9, the number of periods, an K is the number of explanatory variables. 
We then reject the hypothesis of homogeneity of variables.
Once the heterogeneity of variables is detected, we have to move to the choice 
between the regression by the within method or by the method of the least general-
ized squares (GLS). To select the best method, we apply the test of specifi cation of 
Hausman (1978). By referring to the statistics of this test at 10 % level: 10.95 > 9.23 
or (0.0522 < 10%).We accept the hypothesis of correlation between the effects appro-
priate for banks and the explanatory variables. Thus, the appropriate effects are fi xed 
and consequently, it is the within method that will be used. The model with fi xed 
effects is convergent and effective.





it+ = + +
==
∑∑á â ã ) it+ å
26 Niazi Kammoun and Ahmed Ammar





























Equilibrium : E = 0  0.00
Notes: Figures in parentheses are t-statistics
*,**,*** indicate signifi cance levels of 1 %, 5% and 10 %, respectively.
The results presented on table 5 show that E-statistic = 0.003. This statistic is 
signifi cantly null at 5% level. We then accept the hypothesis of the existence of a 
long-run equilibrium of the Tunisian banking system. So, the P-R model can be ap-
plied to study the nature of the competition and the existence of a market power in 
the banking sector.
Step 2: The estimation of the H- statistic
After checking the existence of a long-run equilibrium for the Tunisian banking market, 
we move to the calculation of the H-statistic to identify its competitive dynamics. 
Based on the P-R methodology and following the empirical strategy pursued by 
Claessens and Laeven (2005), we obtain the H-statistic by estimating the equation 
(5) below:
27The Evolution of Competition of the Tunisian Banking Sector: An Empirical Analysis
(5)
Where i denotes banks and t denotes years. TR is the ratio of gross revenues to 
total assets, W1 is the input price of labor, W2 is the input price of deposits and W3 
is the input price of fi xed capital, S1 and S2 are the variables of structure, Finally, α 
denotes bank-level fi xed effects and ε is an error term.
The estimation of the previous expression offers us the degree of competition of a 
given banking sector by considering partial by-products of the function revenue with 
regard to every input price. The application of the “panel data method” provides us 
with the following results: the statistics of Fisher relative to the total test of homoge-
neity are superior to those of the table of Fisher (prob of the test = 0 < 5 %), we then 
reject this hypothesis and we accept that of the heterogeneousness of variables.
The probability of the test of Hausman (0.0001) is lower than 5 %, which allows 
us to accept the hypothesis with fi xed effect and to use the within method. The results 
of estimation according to this model are indicated in table 6.
Table 6: The Competitive Conditions test for Tunisian banks (Fixed Effects estima-





























Competition: H = 1 7.53
Monopoly:   H = 0 2.63
Notes: Figures in parentheses are t-statistics
* ; ** indicate signifi cance levels of 1% and 5% , respectively.
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From this estimated model, we establish the sum of the parameters which are 
considered associated with the input prices of the function of revenue in order to cal-
culate the H-statistic. Since the variables are expressed in logarithms, the coeffi cients 







, which measures the sum of the elasticities of the total revenue with respect 
to the input prices.
The estimations on the sample of all the banks thus show a value of H-statistic = 
0.257. The latter lies between 0 and 1 and it is signifi cantly different from 0 and from 
1 at 5% level. This result indicates that banks in Tunisia are operating as a whole 
under conditions of monopolistic competition. A monopolistic competition structure 
means the existence of product differentiation in banking and that banks tend to dif-
fer with respect to the product quality and advertising.
Let us note fi nally that this result is in compliance with the results generally ob-
tained in the previous studies directed to the estimation of a P-R model applied to 
the banking industry in certain emerging countries. These previous studies generally 
converged and pleaded in favor of a situation of a monopolistic competition as the 
following table suggests.
Table 7: The P-R Model Results in the Recent Studies on Emerging Countries
Authors Sample Period Results
Turk – Ariss (2009)
12 countries in the 
area MENA
2000 - 2006
PC : Bahrain and Turkey
M : North African countries
MC : Other countries
Mensi S. (2009)
10 Tunisian deposit 
banks
1990 - 2007
Oligopolistic competition, in a contestable 
market which confi rms the presence of a 
competitive environment.
Masood O- Chichti J.E. 
– Mansour W. (2009)
12 Saudi Arabian 
banks
1999 - 2007
conjectural variations short run oligopoly
Lapteacru I and Nus E. (2011) 9 countries of PECO 1999 - 2006 MC with an increase market power in Hungary.
Rajhi T. and Salah H. (2011) 15 Algerian banks 2000 - 2007
MC : The Algerian banking sector would be 
less competitive if there were no foreign banks 
Notes: PC: Perfect competition; M: Monopoly; MC: Monopolistic competition
3. The Lerner index
i. The calculation of Lerner index
The Lerner index is computed using the formula (P-MC) / P, where P is the price of 
banking outputs and MC is the marginal cost. Following the approach in Fernandez 
de Guevara, Maudos and Perez (2005 ; 2007) and Berger, Klapper and Turk-Ariss 
(2008), we proxy bank output by using Total assets, P is calculated as total bank rev-
enues over assets, and MC is calculated by taking the derivative from a translog cost 
function shown in equation (6):
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(6)
Where TC is the total operating plus fi nancial costs; TA (ie. Total assets) is a 






 are the same input prices used in equa-
tions (4) and (5) and defi ned above. Finally, i denotes banks and t denotes years, α 
denotes bank-level fi xed effects and ε is an error term.
The estimated coeffi cients of the cost function are then used for computing the 
marginal cost. Indeed, as the marginal cost is the derivative of total cost to output 
(here total assets), it can be derived that the derivative of the logarithm of total cost to 
logarithm of output is the ratio of marginal cost to total cost multiplied by output. As 
a consequence, marginal cost is equal to the product of the derivative of the logarithm 
of total cost to output (i.e. the derivative of equation to total assets TA) multiplied by 
the ratio of total cost to output).
(7)
The application of the panel data method provides us with the following results: 
the statistics of Fisher relative to the total test of homogeneity are superior to those 
in the Fisher’ table (prob of the test = 0 < 5 %), we then reject this hypothesis and we 
accept that of the heterogeneity of variables. The probability of the test of Hausman 
(0.0001) is lower than 5%, which allows us to accept the hypothesis with fi xed effects 
and to use the “Within method”. 
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ln w1* ln W3
-0.023**
(-2.372 )
0,5 * W2 ²
-0.003
(-0.019 )
ln W2 * ln W3
-0.139**
(-2.706)
0,5 *ln W3 ²
0.207*
(10.502 )
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-0.009
(-0.310 )
ln W1 * ln AT
-0.020
(-0.843 )
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-0.056
(-1.014 )









Notes: Figures in parentheses are t-statistics
* ; ** indicate signifi cance levels of 1% and 5 % , respectively.
Having estimated the function cost, we calculate the marginal cost for the 18 
banks of our sample, to determine the Lerner average index for all the banks of our 
sample for every year. The results are recapitulated in the following table:
Table 9: Evolution of the marginal cost, Price and the average Lerner index
Year Average MC Average Price Average Lerner index
2000 0.06688221 0.0889482 0.257809999
2001 0.07164896 0,08574318 0.205499563
2002 0.13386575 0.09127189 0.046964486
2003 0.08517818 0.08720437 0.119101864
2004 0.07340018 0.08663157 0.175604805
2005 0.06894103 0.08542214 0.179663395
2006 0.07426408 0.08737832 0.174411082
2007 0.07325958 0.08960829 0.164976058
2008 0.06862107 0.09745207 0.199790358
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We represent graphically the evolution of these variables over the period 2000 – 2008:
Figure 1: The evolution of the average Lerner index, the price and the marginal cost 
for banking industry (2000 – 2008)
As a whole, the results appearing in fi gure 1 show a certain stability of the aver-
age price of the banking output, due largely to the stability of the level of the interest 
rates observed in Tunisia over the considered period. At the same time, the level of 
the marginal costs has followed a downward trend stimulated by banks’ concern to 
reduce the levels of the banking, fi nancial and operational costs.
As we can see, the Lerner index had a fl uctuating evolution during the period of 
study. Between 2000 and 2002, it fell considerably mainly in 2002 when it dropped 
to its lowest level. This change in the behavior of the Tunisian banks is indeed under-
standable in time of hardships. 
ii. Discussion: The behavior of competition in the Tunisian Banking sector 
The decrease of the competition which could result from the process of concentra-
tion (by mergers and acquisitions, alliances, etc.) is all in all compensated for by the 
decrease of barriers in the entry. The results appearing in the fi gure 1 show a certain 
stability of the average price of the banking output, due largely to the stability of the 
level of the interest rates observed in Tunisia over the considered period. At the same 
time, the level of the marginal costs has followed the same trend within the Tunisian 
banking sector since 2002, stimulated by a concern of reduction the levels of fi nan-
cial and operational costs. For a deeper analysis of the results, we distinguish four 
under periods: 2000 – 2002 ; 2003 – 2004 ; 2005 – 2006 and 2007 – 2008:
g y ( )
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The period 2000 - 2002 is characterized by the rise of the competition and the 
degradation of banks’ market power. In fact, we notice a great decline in Lerner index 
whose values are already very low. In theory, the Lerner index has to take only posi-
tive values. A null value means only a perfect competitive behavior. The values close 
to zero are the evidence of an increased competition where banks have on average 
no market power. Such a behavior of banks within the framework of pricing in the 
marginal cost is considered as “super-competitive” by Shaffer S. (1989; 1993). It is 
about a short-term behavior of struggle to keep market shares. 
Indeed, during this period, the profi tability of most of the Tunisian banks was low 
(see appendix 2). In diffi cult situations characterized by margin losses, the competi-
tion gets tougher and tougher to manage to survive. This competition grew more 
acute for the activities bringing interests such us granting credits, traditional activi-
ties of the Tunisian banks which represented the most important activities of Tunisian 
banks. The table in appendix 2 shows that the general trend of the banks profi tability 
is in decline except for the BT Bank which tries to align itself with the European 
standards (2 %).
The period 2003 – 2004: The restructuring of certain banks in Tunisia revived 
takeovers within the sector. The participation of the foreign investors was strongly 
encouraged by the authorities. In this respect, we can note the acquisition of the “So-
ciété Générale Group” of 52.34 % of the capital of one of the fi rst private banks in 
Tunisia known as the International Union of Banks (UIB). In addition to this strate-
gic purchase, the Economic Development Bank of Tunisia and the National Tourism 
Development Bank have been taken over by the STB. These two operations were 
expressed by a regular increase of the Lerner Index from 0.046 to 0.175 with a de-
creasing of the marginal cost. Figure 1 shows that during this period, the price P 
remains relatively stable and the Lerner index has increased because of the decrease 
in the marginal cost. This implies that trends to the concentration have not affected 
the banking service prices.
The period 2005 – 2006: During this period, the Tunisian banking sector knew 
an exceptional dynamics with, fi rst of all, the creation of a new bank: the Bank of 
Financing of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises) (BFPME) in March, 2005. Then, 
the conversion of STUSID Bank and the BTL Bank into universal banks respectively 
in April and October, 2005. Finally, the privatization of the Banque du Sud (ie. Bank 
of the South) in November, 2005. Besides, the deposit banks continued to develop 
thanks to the extension of their network of agencies making their banking services 
more accessible. Consequently, the performance of deposit banks knew an increase 
of the ROE which rose from 6.5 % in 2005 to 8.8 % in 2007. As for the ROA, it in-
creased from 0.5 % in 2005 to 0.9 % in 2007.
Further to these evolutions, the Tunisian banking system is subjected to two pres-
sures: on the one hand, the rise of the competition with the entry of new banks to the 
sector and on the other hand, the strategies of merger and implemented consolidation 
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by certain banks to face this competition. As we can see in the fi gure 1, the slight 
decrease of the Lerner index (reduction at 6 %) shows that the bank market power is 
declining.
The period 2007-2008: the low values of the Lerner index witnessed an increase. 
This implies that the competition within the bank sector remained intense. This situ-
ation can be explained by the existence of an important number of banks with regard 
to the size of the Tunisian economy _ in spite of the few operations of merger and 
consolidations. Indeed, the banking sector consisted of 20 banks in 2007.
The reforms are going to set up the necessary mechanisms and put together the 
favorable conditions for the strengthening of projection achieved in the economic 
development. These reforms should lead to reduce the fragmentation of the sector, 
to increase the rate of banking, and, fi nally to endow the Tunisian credit institutions 
with a critical size. Such a size would allow them to keep their shares on the local 
market and to set off, in the second stage, to the conquest of new markets. We observe 
on fi gure 1 an improvement of the Lerner index with an increasing price P and a 
decreasing marginal cost. This evolution indicates an increase of the Tunisian banks 
market power. This can indicate also that the Tunisian banking sector is changing 
with the mergers and acquisitions of small as well as big banks which were already 
accomplished at the beginning of 2000’s.
Conclusion
The banking movements of restructuring in Tunisia are considered as the major re-
sponse to the fragmentation of the sector. The merger between banks allows them 
to keep market shares and to face the competition of the foreign banks which could 
penetrate into the national market because of the fi nancial liberalization.
By examining the ratios of banking concentration, we cannot reach a conclusion 
concerning the market evolution. The empirical examination on the conditions of 
the Tunisian banking sector competition from 2000 to 2008, by applying the P-R 
method and that of Lerner index, allows us to test the contestability of the banking 
sector. All in all, our application of the non structural measure of P-R to the Tunisian 
banking system does not enable us to confi rm the hypothesis based on Structure-
Conduct-Performance (SCP) paradigm, according to which the concentration trends 
in the Tunisian banking sector will make banks have a greater market power. The 
empirical results of our study suggest that the banking market in Tunisia was neither 
monopolistic nor perfectly competitive. The value of P-R H-statistic estimated from 
2000 to 2008 really indicates that the banking revenues are acquired by virtue of 
monopolistic competition.
Besides, the Lerner index values calculated over the period are characterized by 
relatively low levels on the one hand and by big adequacy with the results of the 
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analysis based on P-R H-statistic on the other hand. Indeed, those values, which are 
generally low, plead for a quite competitive state of the banking markets. The move-
ments of mergers of banking institutions seem to be slow as a big effort of cleaning 
their balance sheets remains to be carried out before banks can merge. The Tunisian 
monetary authorities aim to reach a situation in which the ratio of banks’ bad debts 
does not exceed 7% by 2014. We notice, however, that the Tunisian banks’ market 
power has gradually taken place since 2002. Indeed, from this date, the Tunisian 
banking sector has seen a few waves of consolidations and privatizations.
The lessons to be drawn on the level of economic policy are so clear: if we consid-
er that the intensifi cation of the competition between banks improves their effi ciency, 
increases the fi nancial stability and widens the range of their products, we must also 
explore other dimensions, particularly the regulatory framework, the supervision as 
well as the development of the other fi nancing sources.
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